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I. INTRODUCTION
The anthrax letter attacks of 2001 dramatically increased public and government awareness regarding the possibilities of a catastrophic attack with a biological agent. In response, the United States government invested in surveillance systems for large cities and critical infrastructure facilities to detect an attack and thereby minimize the exposure of at-risk populations. For example, the BioWatch program, deployed by the Department of Homeland Security, serves to "detect the release of pathogens into the air, providing warning to the government and public health community of a potential bioterror event" [2] . Despite these efforts, one of the recommendations of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism in their 2008 report is that the United States should enhance the nation's response capabilities to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass casualties [1] . The Commission also found that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. Thus, development of improved detection systems to warn against the presence of existing or nextgeneration pathogens remains a priority.
In developing detection and surveillance systems for chemical or biological agents, it is important to conduct a systemslevel analysis of the detection architecture to develop functional requirements that address the needs of the response plan. This analysis is facilitated by the use of computational tools that hypothesize threat scenarios, allow for trade-off studies of detection requirements and aid in operational decision making. This paper introduces one such tool under development at Sandia National Laboratories, the Outdoor Weapons of Mass Destruction Decision Analysis Center (OutDAC). The components and capabilities of OutDAC and a related toolkit at Sandia National Labs are described in detail in Section II.
This paper also derives lessons for the use of OutDAC through an example case study. The systems analysis for detection requirement employs a Monte Carlo simulation to generate the design basis threat, a library of hypothesized attack scenarios that the detection system is designed to protect against. Once the design basis threat is generated, detection requirements can be determined through a series of tradeoff and performance studies. This includes optimization of detector placement locations to offer the greatest level of protection against a catastrophic attack. The usage of a Monte Carlo simulation for optimization in this manner must be done carefully. Through an example case study, Section III derives some lessons for the use of this methodology.
II. MODELING OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DETECTION SYSTEMS
As mentioned above, the analysis and derivation of functional requirements for detection systems of chemical or biological attacks is facilitated with the use of modeling and simulation tools. One such tool, the Outdoor Weapons of Mass Destruction Decision Analysis Center (OutDAC), is in the nascent stages of development and is described in detail below. Future development of OutDAC will see it merge with a related Sandia tool, the Facilities Weapons of Mass Destruction Decision Analysis Center (FacDAC), which addresses indoor threats. Together, these two tools will enable a thorough analysis of detection systems, as catastrophic chemical or biological attacks are a threat to both residents in metropolitan areas and critical infrastructure facilities. For completeness, FacDAC is briefly described in this Section as well.
Both OutDAC and FacDAC use similar approaches to the development of detection system requirements. There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the form that a chemical or biological attack might take. Thus, Monte Carlo simulations are employed to generate the design basis threat, or library of credible attack scenarios that the detection systems is designed against. To determine detection system requirements through trade-off and sensitivity studies, the threat definition and detection system are articulated in a parametric fashion. For instance, a detector is described in terms of its air flow rate and overall limit-of-detection threshold. By doing so, these tools can be employed for other purposes beyond functional requirements analysis, such as incident characterization, consequence assessment, response planning and operational decision support.
A. FacDAC
FacDAC is an integrated system-of-systems toolset that enables the simulation of chemical and biological incidents and responses in facilities. FacDAC has been used to analyze many real-world facilities, including train stations, airports, and office buildings where facility models are built using actual blueprints and heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) specifications. A central component is the generation of aerosol releases inside a facility using the airflow and contamination transport analysis software, CONTAM, developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology [5] .
A Monte Carlo method is employed to capture both the variations and uncertainties in building parameters and weather conditions. Parameters such as the outdoor temperature and wind direction, the filtration efficiency of the HVAC system, and door positions have significant impacts on air flow. These parameters are given probability distributions which are sampled repeatedly, along with varying release locations, to generate a database of thousands of scenarios that comprise the design basis threat. FacDAC analyses employ these large scenario libraries in order to determine detector requirements or design robust detector architectures.
FacDAC incorporates a dynamic population model that allows the movement of every individual to be computed independently. Each person entering an airport, for example, has a unique schedule that may include arrival time, flight departure time, time used for check-in at a ticket counter, time spent processing through security, time spent in a food court, and time spent waiting at the gate. Actual movement through the facility is calculated probabilistically based on current position and destination. The path taken and time spent in a facility determines the exposure level to a chemical or biological agent for a given release scenario. The impact of different agent types on individuals, such as movement away from unpleasant odors, is also included in the model.
B. OutDAC
OutDAC is a modular, system-of-systems tool that integrates multiple modeling components and datasets into a singular analysis center. The Java-based tool is customized for probabilistic calculations of aerosolized threats, specifically chemical and biological agents. The high-level, conceptual layout of OutDAC is shown in Figure 1a . The critical components of OutDAC are:
• A population database, LandScan;
• A database of meteorological data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); • An atmospheric transport and diffusion model, the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC); • The Sensor Placement Optimization Toolkit, SPOT. The actual tool GUI presented to the user is shown in Figure  1b , where the available options represent parameterizations to aid in the assessment of detection requirements.
1) Population Data and Computational Domain:
The LandScan Dataset, available from Oak Ridge National Laboratories, is a worldwide population database [6] . The data are discretized on a 30 ′′ × 30 ′′ latitude/longitude grid and are a measure of ambient population, which includes diurnal and collective travel movements. The information is taken from sub-national census data and apportioned to each grid cell based on likelihoods computed from road proximity, land cover, nighttime lights and other information [7] .
The computational domain for the atmospheric transport and dispersion analysis can be user-generated or taken from predefined domains of the 24 largest metropolitan areas in the US, listed in Table I . The exact boundaries of a metropolitan area are defined by the Census Bureau's Metropolitan Statistical Area, which are areas containing a substantial population nucleus and adjacent communities with a high degree of economic and social interaction with the core [8] .
The overlay of the Metropolitan Statistical Area and the LandScan 2007 database yields tens of thousands of latitudelongitude cells in each metropolitan region. Some grid coars- ening is performed to merge cells with low population values, reducing the total number of cells by an order of magnitude. The cell-centered latitude-longitude positions are used repeatedly throughout the OutDAC analysis process. These positions comprise the potential release locations of a biological agent, the candidate detector locations for placement optimization and the integrated concentration measurement locations to compute inhalation dosages received by the population.
2) Meteorological Data: Real time and forecast meteorological data generated by numerical weather prediction software is stored by NOAA's National Operational Model Archive & Distribution System (NOMADS) [9] . One of the archived datasets is the WRF-NMM, the Nonhydrostatic Mesoscale Model (NMM) component of the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) system run by the National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP). The North American Mesoscale grid used in this dataset is Lambert Conformal with a resolution of 12 km (NAM Grid 218), the domain of which is shown in Figure 2 [10] . A combination of real-time and forecast data representing three hour time intervals for the entire 2008 calendar year was downloaded from the NOMADS repository.
The meteorological data produced by the WRF-NMM is stored in GRIB2-format, a compression and data organization standard common in numerical weather prediction models [11] . Unidata, a program in the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (UCAR), distributes a number of software tools for weather analysis, including the GRIB Java library, which is used to access the data [12] . Through the Unidata GRIB Java library, the OutDAC tool queries the meteorological variables required by the atmospheric transport and dispersion model. These include the 3-D variables of wind vector, temperature, humidity and geo-potential height at incremental isobaric levels, and the 2-D variables of ground elevation, surface albedo, surface roughness, surface heat flux, boundary layer height, cloud cover fraction and precipitation.
To save a significant amount of computational time, every weather file was pre-processed for the twenty four metropolitan domains described above and the data was saved in MEDOC format, a gridded meteorological data convention in ASCII format accepted by HPAC.
3) Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion: The atmospheric transport and dispersion tool used by OutDAC is HPAC, produced by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), but other models could be substituted, if appropriate. It is designed as a means to predict the effects of hazardous material released into the atmosphere and its impact on civilian and military populations [13] . The underlying physical model is the Gaussian plume dispersion code, SCIPUFF [14] . Recent versions of HPAC include a Java application programming interface (API), which facilitates batch and custom processing.
HPAC contains numerous user input options, most of which are not elevated to the OutDAC user. OutDAC is simply configured to drive HPAC in a batch mode for Monte Carlo calculations. The release can be either a stationary, point release or a moving, line release, where the movement vector is orthogonal to the wind vector at a speed of 30 mph. The OutDAC user can select the duration of the release and the percentage of point vs. line releases in the Monte Carlo population. The user can also select from a list of known biological agents in HPAC's database, or can enter a parameterized description of a customized agent (i.e. weight density, aerosol decay rates, particle size distribution, infectious dose, etc.). This feature allows OutDAC to address current and future biological pathogens.
One attack scenario is considered the combination of a release date and time, which incorporates the variation in meteorological data, as well as a release location and release size. Thousands of attack scenarios constitute the Monte Carlo library, which in turn represents the design basis threat. Furthermore, for each attack scenario two nearly identical releases are computed. The first is the agent specified by the user and the second is the same agent modified to have zero decay rate, or perfect stability in the environment. The reason the second release is included is that it is assumed that the detector analysis is DNA-based, meaning a live organism is not required to trigger the detection system.
For every release, OutDAC calls HPAC with a baseline release size of particles in the size range suitable for human inhalation. Since local concentration data scales linearly with the magnitude of the release source (the convection-diffusion equation is linear), identical scenarios with different release sizes can be quickly computed as a linear scaling of the concentration data. The range of release sizes to be considered is specified by the user. The baseline scenarios are scaled across this range and appended to the full attack scenario library.
The OutDAC tool queries the viable and total agent integrated concentration values over the simulation time at the cellcentered latitude/longitude positions described above. These data are then stored in sparse-matrix format for further analysis and detector placement optimization.
4) Optimization:
The optimization software used by Out-DAC is SPOT, developed by Sandia National Laboratories and the Environmental Protection Agency, along with a variety of academic collaborators [15] . SPOT was originally developed for the design of contaminant warning systems for water distribution networks, but it can be generally applied to any detector placement problem. It includes general-purpose heuristic solvers, integer-programming heuristics that find solutions with mathematically provable quality, exact solvers that find globally optimal solutions, and bounding techniques that can evaluate solution optimality [16] .
The library of scenarios computed by OutDAC in the Monte Carlo calculation form the design basis threat that a detection system should defend against. SPOT uses a generic solver formulation that allows a user to specify a performance objective and statistic for optimization. For instance, the number of infections for each release scenario is calculated. SPOT can then optimize detector locations to minimize the mean value of undetected scenarios, as well as other statistics such as median, value-at-risk (VaR), tail-conditioned-expectation (TCE) and worst value. The VaR and TCE statistics originate from the quantification of financial portfolio risk [17] and are depicted graphically in Figure 3 . Given a confidence interval, β ∈ (0, 1), the VaR of a distribution is the value of the distribution at the (1 − β) percentile. The TCE is the expected value of the distribution beyond the (1 − β) percentile. For instance, the 0.95-percentile value of a distribution is the 5% VaR number, because that value is exceeded with a probability of 0.05. The 5% TCE value is the average of the distribution from the 0.95-percentile value and up. Mathematically, given a random variable, W , that describes an impact distribution, these two probabilistic statistics can be expressed as, [18] 
The detector placement optimization is a combinatorial, integer programming problem. SPOT casts this problem as a classical p-median problem and includes a number of algorithms to solve it [19] . Finding globally optimal solutions to this problem can necessitate prohibitively large computational resources and time. Instead, a solution determined heuristically that is in the neighborhood of a local optimum and can be computed rapidly is preferred. The heuristic method used by OutDAC is an adaptation of the greedy randomized adaptive search procedure (GRASP) by Resende and Werneck [20] . In each optimization iteration, candidate solutions are constructed in a greedy sense, meaning that each successive detector placement location is selected according to the largest marginal benefit in the objective function. These candidate solutions are then submitted to a local search to seek out local optima. Further exploration of the design space is done through path relinking, where candidate solutions are combined with previous, highperforming solutions.
To aid in the assessment of detector requirements, many of the parameters required to compute the number of infections from the agent concentration data are presented to the OutDAC user, as shown in Figure 1b . The parameter values for the human breathing rate, the percentage of people indoors and the dosage fraction received by people indoors compared to outdoors are used in conjunction with the gridded population data to compute the total number of infections for each attack scenario. The parameters associated with detector performance are the air flow rate into the collector and the overall limitof-detection threshold (the number of colony-forming-units required to trigger the system). At the locations where the attack scenario generated a total agent integrated concentration greater than the prescribed limit-of-detection, it is assumed that a detector placed at that location will detect the scenario. For biological threats, it is also assumed that detected scenarios have no contribution to the optimization objective function. Meaning, if the objective is to minimize the number of undetected infections, this assumption implies that there are no undetected infections in detected scenarios.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION

A. Problem Description
To demonstrate the OutDAC tool and to investigate the methodology of using Monte Carlo generated scenarios for detector placement optimization, a sample analysis was executed for the Boston metropolitan area. The Metropolitan Statistical Area for Boston is highlighted on the map shown in Figure 4a . The population contours of this region are shown in Figure 4b . The LandScan 2007 Dataset has 15,000 cells in the domain defined by the Metropolitan Statistical Area. Low population value cells were merged to create a coarser mesh of 7,050 cells. As mentioned above, these cell centers were used as candidate release and detector placement locations.
A total of 28,348 attack scenarios were computed to form the Monte Carlo library and design basis threat. These attack scenarios represent a random selection of 21 release locations for every release time. • Collector air flow rate, 100 L/min
B. Monte Carlo Convergence
Monte Carlo simulation convergence criterion is similar to the convergence of other computational tools. Usually, convergence implies reducing a residual or error equation below some user-speficied threshold. However, in a Monte Carlo, there is no direct analogue to a residual equation. Instead, with each iteration, there is a new distribution with its own statistics, such as the mean or moments. As the number of iterations tends towards infinity, the distribution approaches its true form. Monte Carlo simulations generally converge at the same rate as the standard error, O(1/ √ n), where n is the number of elements in the distribution.
For normally distributed outputs, the mean and standard deviation of the output distribution approach their true values within a provable confidence band [21] . If the confidence band is sufficiently small, within some user-specified tolerance, then the Monte Carlo simulation might be considered converged. A histogram of the number of infections resulting from all of the attack scenarios is shown in Figure 5a and is clearly not normally distributed. The Lilliefors' test for normality confirms this observation. Thus, no provable confidence bounds can be placed on the output distribution statistics. Instead, the Monte Carlo convergence becomes somewhat more subjective.
The incremental mean and ±5% tail values for the Monte Carlo simulation at each iteration are shown in Figure 5b . From the scale of the plot, it does appear that these statistics flat-line and converge to a final value. A more telling plot is Figure 5c , where the percentage of error from the final distribution value is tracked across all iterations. If the Monte Carlo simulation is truly converged at the final iteration, then the error in each statistic should gradually diminish as the iteration count approaches the total number. This trend is indeed observed for the mean and 0.95-percentile values, but not for the 0.05-percentile value. The mean drops below 2% error after less than 10,000 iterations and the 0.95-percentile line reaches the same level after 20,000 iterations. The 0.05-percentile value of the distribution cannot be considered converged even after nearly 30,000 iterations. Thus, different statistics converge at different rates.
The Monte Carlo convergence trends observed in Figure 5c are consistent with the shape of the output distribution depicted in Figure 5a . The mean value of infections for all of the attack scenarios is approximately 100,000 people. The maximum number of infections possible in a single scenario is bounded by the total number of people in the Boston metropolitan region, approximately 4.5 million people. In contrast, some scenarios are not effective from an adversary's point-of-view and infect few people. Thus, there is no dramatic tail at the high-end of the distribution, but the tail on the low-end of the distribution extends across five orders of magnitude. The 0.05-percentile value is slow to converge because many iterations are required to develop the long tail at the low-end of the distribution.
C. Optimization Results
Since different distribution statistics converge at different rates, one must be judicious in selecting an optimization objective function, especially if the attack scenario library is limited in number. To emphasize this point, detector placement optimizations were performed for two different metrics with various attack scenario library sizes. Specifically, optimizations to minimize the mean number of undetected infections as well as the 5% VaR were performed for attack scenario library sizes of 500, 1,000, 5,000 and 10,000. The 5% VaR statistic is equivalent to the 0.95-percentile value depicted in Figures 5b  and 5c .
The optimization results for minimization of the mean number of undetected infections is shown in Figure 6a . Clearly using a truncated scenario library with only 500 or 1,000 scenarios gives specious performance metrics. In fact, using the detector positions determined through optimization with a truncated library, one can compute the error in predicted performance between the truncated library and the full scenario library. Since the stakes associated with under-predicting the extent of impact are greater than over-predicting the extent of impact, the under-prediction error only is shown in Figure 6b . The under-prediction error in the mean number of undetected infections is an order of magnitude higher for the smaller library sizes compared to the libraries with 5,000 or 10,000 scenarios.
Equivalent performance and error plots for the 5% VaR statistic are shown in Figures 6c and 6d . For this statistic, with at least 30 detectors, the optimization is able to find a solution such that 95% of scenarios are detected. Since there are no undetected infections in detected scenarios, the 5% VaR statistic is zero. However, in these plots, there is a increased magnitude in the under-prediction error of the 5% VaR number compared to the full scenario library for all optimizations performed. For instance, optimizing the placement of 40 detectors using a library with 1,000 scenarios, one might think that 95% of all scenarios will be detected leading to zero undetected infections, when in fact the actual number is in the thousands. Since the 0.95-percentile value is a slower to converge than the mean value, it is possible the larger errors in Figure 6d compared to Figure 6b are a reflection of this phenomenon. When using a scenario library for detector placement optimization, the quality of the optimization is dependent on the quality and convergence of the underlying Monte Carlo that generates the library.
Ideally one would desire detector placement locations that are robust in all metrics, and do not necessarily optimize a mean or VaR statistic at the expense of the other. To evaluate the choice of optimization metric in terms of robustness, a cumulative metric was created representing the sum of the mean and 5% VaR values of undetected scenarios. This cumulative metric is shown for the two optimizations performed with the 10,000 scenario library in Figure 7 . The value of the cumulative metric is essentially independent of the optimized objective function for this example case through 30 detectors. For 40 and 50 detectors, the minimization of the mean outperforms the minimization of the 5% VaR. However, this is most likely because for these data points, the 5% VaR statistic bottomed out and no further optimization of detector locations was necessary after the first 30 placements. It is also possible that with a more extensive attack scenario library, where a range of release sizes are considered, there would be a discernible disparity in the robustness of the two optimization approaches.
The geographic locations of the optimized detector locations are shown in Figure 8 . In general, the detector locations are distributed along the eastern terminus of the computational domain. This makes sense since the dominant wind direction is from West-to-East. There are, however, some detectors placed far inland, as far as the western terminus of the computational domain. At first it was hypothesized that these detector were the last to be placed by the GRASP algorithm, in that they added the least marginal benefit to the detection system. However, even the optimizations for 10 detectors include locations in the western part of the domain, thereby refuting that argument. Instead, these detectors are placed to detect specific scenarios in the design basis threat that infect large numbers of people. With a more thorough and complete attack scenario library that includes a wide variation of release sizes, the chosen detector locations could be different. Figure 8a compares the 30 detector positions chosen by minimization of the mean and 5% VaR number of undetected scenarios with the 10,000 scenario library. There is no observable or significant difference in the locations between the two statistics, further reinforcing the lesson of Figure 7 that both statistics are equally robust. However, this too might be an artifact of the use of a single, relatively large release size. Figure  8b instead compares the optimized detector locations between the 500 and 10,000 scenario library for the minimization of the mean number of infections in undetected attacks. The chosen detector positions for the 500 scenario library do seem to include a few more inland locations than the 10,000 scenario library. This observation supports the notion that the inland locations are chosen by the optimization to detect specific scenarios.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a tool under development at Sandia National Laboratories, OutDAC, which can be used to perform detection system requirements studies for outdoor attacks of a biological agent. An example detector placement problem was presented, beginning with the threat definition, for the Boston metropolitan area. Future work on OutDAC will focus on the inclusion of chemical threats, the addition of other detection system performance metrics and incorporation of a disease evolution model to translate the number of infections to casualties. Future development will see the amalgamation of OutDAC and a similar tool focused on critical infrastructure facilities, FacDAC. Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
